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Editor’s note
This issue marks the start of CentrePiece’s fourth year. As
usual, the magazine is packed with topical, sometimes
controversial material: one indication of the industriousness
and diversity of the members of the Centre for Economic
Performance whose work underpins CentrePiece. 
Our cover story (page 8) challenges those who argue that
British A level students need to widen their range of study:
Anna Vignoles says employers and universities seem to
prefer specialisation at A level. What employers want, above
all, though is mathematics: the higher salaries commanded
by those with maths A level is a clear signal that schools
should do more to encourage their students in this direction.
In this issue, we also revisit two subjects CentrePiece has
looked at in the past. In the first of a new series on research
in progress at the CEP, Sue Fernie looks at industrial
relations in the service sector including that part of the
service sector she has made her own - telephone call
centres. And David Metcalf, a member of the Low Pay
Commission, looks forward to the introduction of the
minimum wage by focussing on those who will benefit most
- low-paid workers in the service sector, where there is
evidence that employers have started gearing up for the big
change that April will bring. 
As we go to press there is much anticipation about the
Bank of England’s scope for action on interest rates over
the coming months. Instead of trying to second guess the
experts, Charles Bean looks at the difficulties involved in
assessing how well the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee
has been doing its job - and suggests that there are some
useful lessons in the British experience for the new
European Central Bank. 
Printing deadlines caused problems for another of our
contributors: in our Guest Column, Kate Barker, Chief
Economist of the CBI, tries to assess what last year’s global
upheavals mean for the UK economy. Her problem has been
what to say about this year’s global upheavals! The year got
off to an unexpectedly bumpy start, with the implications for
the world economy of the Brazilian crisis still far from clear.
We are pleased to welcome two more outsiders: Timothy
Besley and Robin Burgess both from the CEP’s neighbour,
STICERD. They too offer a challenge, to all those who like
to insist that inequality is the price to be paid for national
economic success. Think again, say Besley and Burgess. 
Last, but not least, is our resident weightless economist
Danny Quah who writes about the importance of intellectual
property in his regular column. 
Many thanks to those of you who took the trouble to
complete our readers’ survey. Winners of the prize draw are
listed on the inside of the cover.
Graham Ingham
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
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ith most people still reeling from the
Chancellor’s shock tactics, he moved
swiftly to implement his newly-
announced policy. A new, nine-
member Monetary Policy Committee
was established at the Bank: it
comprises a mix of old Bank hands and a group of
outsiders, some of whom are part-time. It is they, meeting
once a month, who decide whether interest rates should
go up, down or stay the same. Their deliberations
(published two weeks after the event) and their decisions
are both closely studied by market operators and
commentators who are constantly seeking clues about the
future direction of policy. The MPC decisions – raising
interest rates gradually in 1997 and then lowering them in
late 1998 (and early 1999) – have been controversial; and
have focused attention on the issue of accountability: who
decides whether the Bank is doing a good job?
The new regime
The new arrangements are enshrined in
the Bank of England Act which follows
the wording of the Maastricht Treaty in
mandating the Bank to pursue an objec-
tive of price stability and, without preju-
dice to that objective, to support the
general economic policies of the government, including
those with respect to growth and employment. An annual
remit from the Chancellor of the Exchequer then gives a
precise form to the definition of price stability, presently a
target for the annual growth rate of the Retail Prices Index
(excluding mortgage interest payments) of 2.5%, although
over an unspecified time horizon.
If the annual inflation rate deviates more than 1% point
either side of the 2.5% target, then the Governor of the
Bank of England is expected to write an Open Letter to the
In May 1997,the new Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, took everyone
by surprise when, within days of taking office, he announced that he
was to hand over responsibility for setting interest rates to the Bank of
England. But who decides whether the Bank is doing a good job? 
The CEP’s Charles Bean, who is specialist adviser on monetary 
policy to the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons,
looks at the difficulty of measuring the Bank’s performance – and 
offers his own judgement.
Holding the Bank
to account
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Chancellor explaining the reasons for the divergence from
the target, what actions the Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) is taking to bring inflation back to target, and how
long the divergence is expected to last; subsequent letters
will be sent quarterly until inflation is within 1% point of the
target. The associated 1.5%-3.5% band is explicitly not
intended as a target range, but rather as defining the points
at which this Open Letter is triggered.
This new regime is supposed to preclude the manipulation
of interest rates for short-term political advantage. But the
flip side of delegation of this powerful weapon of economic
policy to a nominated, rather than elected, body is a need
to ensure that the Bank and the MPC can be held to
account for their actions. Accountability is achieved through
a variety of channels. First, through a reformed Court of the
Bank of England (the Bank’s governing body): this is
charged with ensuring that the MPC operates in an efficient
manner, taking full account of available sources of informa-
tion and so on. Second, there is accountability to the
Chancellor, through the aforementioned Open Letter,
although clearly this only operates when such an Open
Letter is triggered. Third come parliamentary committees
who hold regular hearings to take testimony from MPC
members. The main player here has so far been the
Commons Treasury Select Committee but this is set to be
complemented by a similar House of Lords Committee that
includes some pretty heavyweight names in British
economics. In many ways this is the most visible channel of
accountability since such meetings are both public and
sometimes televised. 
Finally, the Bank is accountable in a rather more diffuse
way via press and media commentary, as well as expert
evaluation by outside economists in the City, business and
academia. Unfortunately some of the press and media
commentary has initially concentrated rather too much on
the backgrounds and personalities of those on the MPC
rather than the quality of their decisions, but maybe that will
improve with time!
Ex post accountability
So much for the mechanisms of account-
ability. But what should the Bank be held
accountable for? This might seem a
rather trivial question, since it has been
given a numerical target for the inflation
rate of a specific price index. Surely one
can just check whether they have achieved what they were
asked to achieve? In fact such ex post accountability is not
as straightforward as it might seem.
First, because monetary policy operates with long and
somewhat variable lags, and economic forecasts are
inevitably fallible, the inflation target of 2.5% will be hit only
by chance. More usually, shocks and unavoidable control
errors will mean that inflation outturns are lower or higher
than the target. If the MPC took the best decisions it could
have done, given the information that was available to it at
the time, then it would be unfair to censure it for missing
the target – that would be like sacking Sir Richard
Greenbury, Chairman of Marks and Spencer, simply
because M&S’s profits turned down in a general recession.
The shareholders of M&S can get round this problem by
benchmarking the performance of M&S’s management
against that of its competitors. In the monetary policy
sphere, such benchmarks are provided by the forecasts of
outside bodies and analysts. So censure would be in order
if the MPC raised rates when commentators outside
thought it unnecessary, and inflation a couple of years
down the road undershot the target; but if those outsiders
had supported its actions then it would be unreasonable to
hold the MPC responsible for the subsequent undershoot.
The fact that the inflation target will not be hit exactly is
recognised explicitly in the annual letter from the Chancellor
to the Governor. But over longish periods of time episodes
of overshoot ought to be roughly matched by periods of
undershoot so that inflation should average 2.5% over a
reasonable time period if the MPC is doing its job. So
perhaps this provides another way to measure the perfor-
By Charles Bean
The flip side of delegation of this powerful
weapon of economic policy to a nominated,
rather than elected, body is a need to
ensure that the Bank and the MPC can be
held to account for their actions.
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mance of the MPC? Unfortunately this is on the one hand
not very practical, and on the other insufficiently demand-
ing. It is not very practical for the simple reason that one
needs a decade or more to apply the ‘2.5% on average’
test, by which time most members of the MPC will have
retired to their villas in the country. It is not very demanding
for the reason that ‘2.5% on average’ could be consistent
with excessively volatile growth and inflation from one year
to the next. One therefore needs to know not only whether
the inflation target is being achieved on average, but also
whether it is being achieved in the right manner.
Optimality and efficiency
It is a central tenet of macro-economics
that one cannot achieve a permanently
higher level of activity simply by tolerating
a higher inflation rate, for eventually
people cotton on to the fact that inflation
is higher and mark up wages and prices
appropriately. Indeed, if anything, the relationship is likely to
go the other way, since high inflation is usually associated
with variable and unpredictable inflation which is likely to be
harmful for the efficient functioning of the economy. But
there is ample evidence to suggest that there is a trade-off
between output and inflation in the short run. And because
it takes time for interest rates to affect demand, and for
demand then to affect inflation, there is not much the MPC
can do to affect today’s inflation rate. The best they will be
able to do is bring inflation back towards target a year or so
down the road. Consequently the MPC is faced with a
trade-off between the volatility of output and the volatility of
inflation. The Figure below illustrates this by plotting a
measure of the volatility of both output and inflation against
each other. It shows that the MPC could get inflation back
Wise central bankers will tend to discount 
new information, particularly when it conflicts
with other information that is available, 
and consequently the response to ‘news’ 
will be muted. 


















Figure 1 The Bank’s Policy Frontier
Central banks around the world display
a tendency both to move interest rates
in small amounts, and to prefer a
sequence of small steps in the same
direction rather than 
a single large one.
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quickly towards target, but only if they are prepared to put
up with large fluctuations in output. Alternatively they could
smooth output fluctuations, but only by tolerating inflation
persistently above or below target.
This volatility trade-off is more strictly a policy frontier, as
bad policies (ie, those above the curve in the Figure) could
lead to both output and inflation being excessively volatile.
There are thus two distinct issues here that Parliament, and
the public at large, might be concerned about. First, is
policy being conducted efficiently, in the sense of being on
this frontier? And, second, given that it is being conducted
efficiently, is it being conducted optimally, in the sense of
getting the balance between stabilising output and stabilis-
ing inflation right?
Let’s take the second question first. A lot of press and
public discussion assumes that the Bank are supposed
only to care about inflation, and this has led to calls for
output to be explicitly added to the list of objectives. But
this assumption is wrong, as we saw at the beginning: the
MPC are supposed to foster growth and employment,
subject to meeting their inflation target in the medium-term.
In fact, the form of the remit is quite an elegant way of
capturing the fact that while there may be no long-run
output-inflation trade-off, there is a short-run one, and that
the MPC thus have a degree of discretion over how
quickly to return inflation to target if it has wandered off.
Now it might seem to be a problem for accountability that
this is not explicitly specified in the remit: if the MPC have
not been told what balance to place on output vis-a-vis
inflation, how can they be held accountable? In practice
this appears not to be a problem, because empirically this
frontier seems to be rather sharply curved, as shown in the
Figure; furthermore most ‘reasonable’ weightings of output
vis-a-vis inflation should lead the MPC to pick pretty much
the same point on this frontier, namely in the region of 
the ‘kink’. In other words there is not much ambiguity
about the speed at which inflation should be brought 
back to target; the numbers actually imply that the MPC
should aim to eliminate roughly half of any expected diver-
gence of inflation from target within about a year to
eighteen months.1
Getting it right
So we come back to the prior question of
efficiency, which then revolves around
whether the MPC’s interest rate strategy
is right. Now central banks around the
world display a tendency both to move
interest rates in small amounts, and to
prefer a sequence of small steps in the same direction
rather than a single large one. In addition, they show a
marked dislike of policy reversals, in the sense that after an
increase (or decrease) in interest rates, the next movement
in interest rates is usually in the same direction; and that
reversals in direction are usually separated by a relatively
long stretch of time.2 The MPC has displayed a similar
collective tendency to move in small sequential steps3 and
to try to avoid early policy reversals.4
Theory suggests that short-term interest rates should be
close to being a random walk, with changes in interest
rates being largely a response to ‘news’ about the
economic environment. Since ‘news’ is necessarily unpre-
dictable, it then follows that roughly half the time an
increase in interest rates should be followed by a decrease
and vice versa. This is only an approximate result, since if
interest rates are above their long-run level (given by the
equilibrium real interest rate plus the target rate of inflation,
i.e. around 5%), then they must be expected to decline
over time. Nevertheless the random walk model provides a
useful benchmark against which actual policy appears to
deviate significantly.
A tendency to move interest rates by only small amounts is
quite sensible for two reasons. First, data about the current
state of the economy is frequently unreliable and prone to
revision – witness the debacle over the earnings figures last
year (when the official earnings figures were withdrawn
temporarily because of concern about their unreliability).
The contrast with the new European
Central Bank (ECB) which is set to follow
the relatively secretive Bundesbank
model could not be starker.
Wise central bankers will thus tend to discount new infor-
mation, particularly when it conflicts with other information
that is available, and consequently the response to ‘news’
will be muted. Second, the effect of interest rate changes
on the economy is uncertain. Large movements will tend to
increase the uncertainty in the economy, and a more
cautious approach is warranted.
Rather harder to rationalise is the tendency to make larger
changes in interest rates in a sequence of small steps (note
that this is different from the foregoing argument, which
simply implies that small rather than large changes are
usually the appropriate action), and to try to avoid early
policy reversals. Such a strategy makes sense when rever-
sals impose real costs on the economy, but it is difficult to
see what these might be. It is clear, though, that there is a
presentational problem with policy reversals: commentators
are apt to see them as reflecting indecision or incompe-
tence on the part of the MPC. In that case the MPC might
be tempted to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. The problem,
of course, with this strategy is that it results in monetary
policy being ‘behind the curve’ and thus inefficient. It also
means policy makers may not get the credit they deserve
because their actions will sometimes appear belated.
Is ex ante accountability easier?
Holding the Bank to account ex post is
not as easy as it may first appear. But the
need to benchmark the Bank’s views
against those of outside forecasters and
analysts suggests that a degree of
concurrent, or ex ante, accountability is
also possible. This requires the Bank’s thinking about the
current conjuncture and economic prospects to be
exposed to critical analysis, something that is done in
spades by the media and city economists, as well as
through the formal parliamentary channels. Transparency in
policy formulation is essential for this to be done effectively;
this is provided through prompt publication of the minutes
of MPC meetings, as well as the quarterly Inflation Report
which provides a fuller statistical picture behind MPC
decisions. Compared to the information provided by most
other central banks, both the minutes and the Inflation
Report are generally to be applauded for their openness
and frankness. At present there is only one slight
weakness, which is in the presentation of the Bank’s infla-
tion forecasts. These appear rather out of nowhere, at the
end of the Report, with relatively little explanation about the
assumptions and judgements that have gone in to them.
Consequently it is often difficult for outsiders to make valid
comparisons with outside forecasts. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that the forecasts
are probabilistic – the so-called ‘fan charts’ – and are
centred around the modal, or single most likely, outturn.
That they are probabilistic, rather than being just a single
number, is a Good Thing, as it emphasises the (consider-
able) margins of uncertainty associated with economic
forecasting, and centring the fan charts around the modal
outcome serves to highlight when the risks are skewed in
one direction or another. It is inevitable that the eye of the
casual reader is attracted to the central, modal forecast as
it is the most densely shaded region. But it makes little
sense operationally to focus on the modal forecast – that is
tantamount to ignoring the presence of risk altogether –
and measures like the average, or mean, forecast are more
informative. Now these distinctions matter little when the
balance of risks are symmetric, but when they are skewed
the differences can be significant. Thus the May and
August 1998 Reports both had a central forecast with infla-
tion pretty much on target two years down the road, but
with a balance of risks to inflation on the upside. In fact the
average expected inflation rate two years on was nearly 3%
rather 2.5%; if this had been clear to outsiders, it might
have helped the MPC justify their decision to raise rates in
June 1998.
A second problem with the Bank’s forecasts is that they
are conditional on an assumption of unchanged interest
rates, whereas most outside forecasters will be assuming
interest rates will be changed to reflect economic circum-
stances. Thus outside commentators compared directly
the Bank’s central forecast for growth of about 1% for
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Because it takes time for interest
rates to affect demand, and for
demand then to affect inflation, there
is not much the MPC can do to affect
today’s inflation rate. The best they
will be able to do is bring inflation
back towards target a year or so
down the road.
1999 and 2% for 2000 in the November 1998 Inflation
Report with the Pre-Budget Treasury forecasts of 1-1.5%
and 2-2.5% respectively, concluding the Bank was 
slightly more pessimistic. Reading between the lines,
however, it was clear that the Treasury had some pretty
hefty interest rate cuts factored in, so that the Bank was
actually more optimistic. 
Fortunately, the Bank also usually produces an alternative
fan chart conditional on implicit market beliefs about the
future path of interest rates rather than assuming current
rates are unchanged, which makes comparisons with
outside forecasters easier. However, even here difficulties
remain, as the fan charts assume the same future level of
interest rates whatever happens to output and inflation,
whereas presumably if inflation is higher than expected
interest rates will be higher, and vice versa. As a conse-
quence the fan chart tends to overstate the degree of
uncertainty about future inflation, as countervailing policy
actions can be expected if inflation is starting to drift off
target; this overstatement of the risks is, of course, equally
true of the main inflation fan chart which assumes
unchanged interest rates.
An example in Europe?
But these are relatively small quibbles set
against the general openness and trans-
parency of the Inflation Report, and the
decision-making process more generally.
Measuring the Bank’s success may, as
we have seen, be difficult: but most of
these difficulties go with the territory. The framework now in
place at least recognises the problems and tries to
overcome them. 
The contrast with the new European Central Bank (ECB)
which is set to follow the relatively secretive Bundesbank
model could not be starker. Those used to that cosy
approach have looked on in horror when the arguments
and disagreements within the MPC have been ridiculed in
the some sections of the British press. But openness,
transparency and accountability all help to build legitimacy,
something that the ECB is desperately in need of in these
early days of the euro. Without this democratic legitimacy,
they will too easily find themselves in the role of scapegoat
for Euroland’s economic ills. Whilst they may not be obliged
to expose themselves to scrutiny in the way the Bank of
England now is, the Governing Council and Executive
Boards of the ECB would be wise to resolve to do so
voluntarily. Even though the UK is not joining the euro in the
first wave, perhaps we still have something immediately
useful to contribute to the success of the project.
CentrePiece Spring 1999 7
Footnotes
1. They also imply the Governor should be writing Open Letters about half
the time, although because of the persistence in inflation these will tend to
come in bunches, not at random intervals. 
2. The empirical backing for the claims in the text appear in C. Bean, 
‘The New UK Monetary Arrangements: A View from the Literature’,
Economic Journal, November 1998.
3. These results were reported by a member of the MPC, Charles
Goodhart, in the annual Keynes lecture delivered to the British Academy,
the text of which is forthcoming in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.
In this class I would place the MPC’s collective decisions over interest
rates in Summer 1997: it was hardly a secret that the Bank thought
interest rates ought to have been higher in the run-up to the election, yet
the MPC collectively chose not to raise rates significantly immediately on
taking over responsibility for interest rates, preferring instead a sequence
of 1/4% point steps. 
4. For instance in February 1998 the MPC minutes cited the argument for
not raising interest rates, despite worries about incipient inflationary
pressures, on the grounds that an increase in interest rates might soon
have to be reversed, whilst the same ‘wait-and-see’ argument was used
to justify a small, rather than large, cut in October 1998.
Photograph of the Bank of England courtesy of The Corporation of London.
Some of the press and media commentary
has initially concentrated rather too much
on the backgrounds and personalities of
those on the MPC rather than the quality of
their decisions.
Charles Bean is Professor of Economics at the LSE
and a member of the CEP’s Growth and Technology
research programme.
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1 Students will take revised Advanced Subsidiary (AS) qualifications after
the first year of sixth form: these exams will equate to the first half of a full 
A Level course.
A levels:
does less mean more?
Education is now seen as key to
improving Britain’s economic
performance; and improving
educational standards is one
of the government’s
principal objectives. 
The challenge is to ensure
that reforms work in the
way they are intended to.
Anna Vignoles examines
the controversy over
planned changes to the 
A level system.
A
re A Levels really the ‘gold standard’ of the
English secondary education system? As the
number of graduates continues to rise in the
UK, amid a growing perception that educa-
tional standards are falling, proponents claim
that A Levels are our only guard against
further deterioration in the quality of our education system.
Public confidence in these rigorous and internationally
respected qualifications remains high. Indeed many
employers base their graduate recruitment on A Level
grades, rather than degree results, as an apparently more
effective way of identifying able applicants.
Yet critics of the A Level system claim that it does not
adequately prepare students for the world of work, offers
too narrow a curriculum and does not provide students with
the essential skills they need. This view is summed up by
the British Institute of Management who claim that ‘A levels
provide overly specialised knowledge to a narrow elite...’
(The Independent, 26 June 1997). More recently Sir Ron
Dearing, in his review of 16-19 education, successfully
pressed the case for reform. Although the government has
remained firmly committed to A Levels, students will now
be encouraged to take up to five different subjects in their
first year of sixth form1, possibly in addition to a ‘key skills’
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course in information technology, communication and the
‘application of number’.
Our research (using data from the National Child
Development Study and a national representative sample of
1980 graduates) indicates that firms do not prefer individu-
als who study a broader curriculum at A level. Students
who take a broader range of A Level subjects at age 16-19
earn no more once they start work than pupils who study a
more specialised curriculum. In fact, pupils who take A
levels in closely related subjects seem to do better acade-
mically and are more likely to get a degree. Moreover, firms
do pay a large wage premium for individuals who have A
Level mathematics, suggesting a relative shortage of
numerical skills.
Is a ‘broader’ curriculum ‘better’?
The extent of subject specialisation at A Level is illustrated
in Table 1 (below). It is clear from this that the academic
curriculum at 16-19 currently appears to be very narrow for
many students. In 1997, for instance, 32% of pupils with 3
or more A Level passes took only social science or arts
subjects, while 60% specialised either in all science or all
non-science A Levels. A relatively small proportion (40%)
studied a mixture of both. Other sources indicate that the
degree of specialisation at A Level is even more
pronounced among graduates: only 30% combine science
and non-science subjects at A Level.
English 16-19 year olds therefore appear to study a narrow
curriculum, normally taking only three A Levels, often in
closely related subjects. This degree of specialisation is
markedly greater than in many other European countries –
including Scotland (where the educational system differs
significantly in several respects). Table 2 (below) shows the
difference between the 16-19 curriculum of a sample of
English and Scottish graduates: it indicates the proportion
of English and Scottish graduates who took only science
subjects at 16-19, those who took only non-science
subjects and those who took a mix of the two. The vast
majority of the Scottish students took both science and
non-science subjects at 16-19, whereas less than 30% of
the English graduates studied such a broad curriculum.
Since the main objective of the proposed reform of the A
Level system is to broaden out the curriculum at age 16-19,
a crucial question is whether taking a broader range of
subjects at A Level is in some sense ‘better’ for students
Table 1 A Level Specialisation
Subject Specialisation Female Male Total
Specialised – taking science and mathematics subjects only 11% 25% 18%
Specialised – taking social science subjects only 3% 6% 4%
Specialised – taking arts subjects only 10% 3% 7%
Specialised – taking social science and arts subjects only 39% 23% 32%
Non-specialised - taking both science and non-science subjects 37% 43% 40%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Department for Education and Employment, Statistics of Education, 1997. 
This table includes all 17 and 18 year olds in schools and FE colleges who achieved 3 or more A Level passes. 
Table 2 English/Scottish Comparison of Curriculum at Age 16-19
English Graduates Scottish Graduates
Specialised – taking science and mathematics subjects only 28% 4%
Specialised – taking only non-science subjects 45% 23%
Non-specialised – taking a mix of science and non-science subjects 27% 73%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Department of Employment, 1986 UK National Survey of Graduates and Diplomates. 
By Anna Vignoles
CentrePiece Spring 199910
and/or employers. If students who take a wider range of
subjects at A Level are actually more productive in the
workplace, this would provide some evidence that a broader
curriculum is superior. There may be numerous non-
economic reasons to broaden the curriculum, for example to
enhance pupils’ enjoyment of learning. But most of the
arguments used in public debate on this issue have focused
on the need for students to have a broader range of knowl-
edge and skills to meet the demands of the labour market:
so the economic arguments for A Level reform merit particu-
lar attention. If a ‘broader’ education is better in the sense of
enabling individuals to be more effective in their jobs, one
would expect to see firms paying a wage premium to attract
the relatively few students who take a wider range of
subjects at A Level. This is what we set out to discover.
Breadth doesn’t pay
There are a number of different ways one might evaluate
the breadth of an individual’s curriculum at A level. We
counted the number of different curriculum areas he or she
had studied, taking into account the overall number of A
Levels they had obtained. For example, an individual who
took A Levels in mathematics, humanities and arts would
be considered ‘broader’, having studied 3 different curricu-
lum areas, than an individual who had taken the same
number of A Levels but only in science subjects. Our model
then measured the effect of A Level curriculum breadth on
these individuals’ eventual salary level, taking into account a
multitude of other factors that are known to influence
earnings (such as whether the person went on to get a
degree or not). We found that individuals who study a
broader curriculum at A Level do not earn any more than
those who are more specialised at 16-19. 
There are other possible indicators of curriculum breadth at
16-19, such as having a general studies A Level. Yet again,
individuals with general studies A Level earn no more than
those who do not take this qualification. What’s more,
Scottish students appear to earn no more than their English
counterparts as a result of their greater curriculum breadth.
This evidence clearly shows that firms are not currently
interested in hiring, and paying more for, individuals who
have a broader educational background. 
Specialisation is more rewarding
Interestingly, we also found that pupils who study a more
specialised A Level curriculum are more likely to get a
degree, either because they are more likely to apply and
get accepted into higher education or because they are
more likely to succeed once they get there. This may reflect
the fact that university entry requirements tend to favour
students with greater subject specialisation. Equally,
students may find the three year degree course offered in
England and Wales more manageable if they have already
specialised in their subject area at A Level. Attempts to
reform the A Level system and broaden the curriculum at
16-19 may therefore be unsuccessful without also reform-
ing our 3 year degree system. Some universities have
already put forward a case for extending the 3 year degree
to 4 years, citing a decline in the standard of applicants in
support of such a change. Broadening the curriculum at
16-19 is likely to reduce the subject specific knowledge of
higher education entrants even further, making it still more
difficult to sustain a three year degree programme. 
Not enough maths and science?
A rather different accusation levelled at the A Level system
is that it does not provide sufficient numbers of students
with some of the important skills required by employers. In
particular, employers have complained about the difficulty of
recruiting individuals with advanced mathematics and
scientific skills. It’s true that a large proportion of individuals
drop science and mathematics altogether at age 16. 
Table 1 (previous page) shows that 43% of students with 3
or more A Level passes take no science or mathematics at
all at age 16-19. Even more striking are the figures in Table
3 (below) showing that in 1997 only 9% of all A Levels
entries were in mathematics and 21% in science. This
compares to the growing popularity of social science and
arts subjects, which together constituted nearly half of all A
Level entries last year.
Standard economic theory suggests that if there is a short-
age of a particular skill, then individuals who possess this
skill will earn more than those who do not, at least in the
short run. Over the longer term, of course, one would
expect the higher earnings associated with a particular skill
to provide an incentive for individuals to invest in education
or training to acquire that skill. This in turn would increase
the supply of the skill, and reduce the wage premium
associated with it. So one way to verify whether there is
really a shortage of higher level mathematics skills is to
assess whether employers actually pay a wage premium for
workers who have mathematics A Level. They do.
Individuals who have mathematics A Level earn between
7% and 11% more than otherwise similar individuals who
Table 3 A Level Subject Entries
Subject No of entries Proportion
Sciences 150,547 21%
Mathematics 63,858 9%
Social sciences 216,415 30%
Arts 121,250 17%
English 89,043 13%
General Studies 72,456 10%
Total No of Entries 713,569 100%
Source: Department for Education and Employment, Education Statistics,
1997. This table includes all candidates in schools or FE colleges.
If a ‘broader’ education is better in the sense of enabling individuals to be more
effective in their jobs, one would expect to see firms paying a wage premium to attract
the relatively few students who take a wider range of subjects at A Level.
do not take mathematics beyond the age of 16. An
economics graduate who has mathematics A Level will
earn up to 11% more than a similar economics graduate
who has not, clearly an impressive wage premium. Other
skills and knowledge, such as those embodied in a science
A Level, did not appear to be in such relatively short supply. 
So why doesn’t everyone take maths?
An obvious question is why students who could potentially
earn more if they took mathematics A Level do not choose
to do so in sufficient numbers. One possibility is that the
wage premium paid to those with maths A Level is merely
temporary. Over the longer run, we may expect the
numbers taking maths to increase and the wage premium
associated with mathematics to fall. But our research
suggested that the wage premium may be more permanent,
since we found evidence of it in both the 1980s and 1990s.
One possible explanation for this is that many students lack
the preparatory knowledge required to take mathematics A
Level. Certainly mathematics is commonly thought of as a
‘hard’ subject by A Level students. Alternatively, students
may be unaware of the wage premium associated with
mathematics A Level. Both of these potential problems
would suggest that attention should be focused on the 14-
16 age group, in terms of developing their mathematics
skills further and informing them of the benefits of continu-
ing mathematics past the age of 16. Equally, if all 16-19
year olds were required to take mathematics to a higher
standard than GCSE, this might meet at least some of the
needs of firms. 
The right way forward
In a properly functioning market, relative wages should
provide an unambiguous indication of any skills shortages.
If individuals who study a broader A Level curriculum are
more productive and in relatively short supply, then they
should earn higher wages. Yet our research found no
evidence that employers value students who take a broader
A Level curriculum more highly. This result has several
policy implications. Since students do not earn any more
from taking a broader 16-19 curriculum, there is little incen-
tive for them to follow the government’s recommendations
and take extra subjects at A level. This will especially be the
case if a broader curriculum entails more effort on the part
of students. Unless the government decides to impose
curriculum breadth at A Level, it is unlikely that reforming
AS Levels and encouraging students to take 5 subjects in
the first year of the sixth form will have a huge effect on the
curriculum actually taken by pupils at 16-19. Even if
students do opt to take the reformed AS Levels, they may
be inclined to take them in subjects that are complementary
to their main A Level subjects, thereby not significantly
broadening their curriculum. 
Furthermore, the fact that more specialised A level students
appear to do better when it comes to higher education is
likely to reinforce opposition to broadening the curriculum. 
If universities do take the view, as they appear to, that
students need to be specialised prior to starting a three year
degree course, the success of the government’s proposals
to broaden the 16-19 curriculum will depend on the 
co-operation of universities in changing their entry require-
ments to put less emphasis on subject specialisation. 
But it is also possible that A Level specialisation genuinely
enhances students’ performance in higher education.
Certainly the English 3 year degree system requires
students to have a high level of subject knowledge, prior to
entry into university, to cope with the workload. This may
mean that broadening the curriculum at 16-19 will be diffi-
cult, without also lengthening degree courses. Our
evidence shows that students have no real incentive to take
on the additional workload of taking extra courses at A
Level, particularly in subjects that are very different from
their three main A Levels. 
Maths again
The continuing high premium paid to those with
Mathematics A Level is evidence that, in some respects,
the education system is currently failing employers. The
government’s emphasis on mathematical key skills, as well
as the much publicised numeracy campaign and the
proposed ‘free standing’ maths courses for adults, suggest
the shortage of mathematics skills is at last being taken
seriously. But here too reform needs to be carefully thought
through. A key skills course aimed at developing students’
advanced mathematical skills, and targeted particularly at
individuals who do not intend to take mathematics A Level,
may help meet the needs of employers and benefit
students. But a course in lower level mathematics will not
necessarily benefit employers or students. The details of
the government’s proposed 16-19 key skills course are as
yet unclear but there is a danger that the standard may be
set too low in order to accommodate students doing
vocational qualifications (NVQs and GNVQs). 
Reforms which work
Everyone endorses the objective of raising educational
standards. How this is best achieved is rather more contro-
versial. There is a danger that high profile reforms will not
meet expectations because they do not take sufficient
account of the evidence available. Our research suggests
that the current A Level system may have more going for it
than its detractors would have us believe.
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on Tyne. 
Our evidence shows that students have no real incentive to take on 
the additional workload of taking extra courses at A Level, particularly in
subjects that are very different from their three main A Levels.
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n the summer of 1998, 12 million people – more than
half the British workforce – were employed in the private
service sector, a massive 20% increase over the previ-
ous 5 years. By contrast, only 4.7 million were employed
in private manufacturing, a figure hardly changed since
1993. The days of Britain as the workshop of the world
are long gone; instead we are engaged in “customer
service”, and often perform this role in a purpose-built,
aircraft hangar-style, modern construction, miles away from
our customers. We smile sweetly and mention nice days
when we hand over the cappucino, and offer back
massages to stressed out city workers as they ponder the
provenance of their next million. We often work at night and
weekends, sometimes for very low pay, and usually in a non-
union environment.
Conscious of the need to know more about how these new
industries work and how workers fare in them, the CEP has
been conducting new research in this area, and trying to
pull together research going on elsewhere. A few weeks
ago, a group of Centre researchers met with academics
from across the UK to look at three main themes: the
nature of the 24-hour economy and the implications this has
for the composition of the workforce, the hours and times
they work and how this differs from other sectors; payment
systems and levels of pay; and problems of employee
representation in a sector that has traditionally been seen
as difficult to unionise.
The 24-hour economy
Round the clock shift-working is hardly a
new phenomenon.
What is new is its
recent and rapid exten-
sion from manufacturing
into services. Can there
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published an article about
telephone call centres and the
new working environment they
provide for an increasing number
of British workers. This article
and the groundbreaking research
on which it was based attracted
enormous attention – a reflection
of the extent to which the service
sector provides jobs for an
increasing number of British
workers. These work patterns 
are the subject of a growing 
body of research at the CEP: 
and here Sue Fernie reports 
on the findings which emerged





be anyone who doesn’t know that it’s possible to bank or
shop at any time of the day or night – even if they
themselves don’t use those facilities? The media has
become fascinated with the impact these dramatic shifts in
the British lifestyle have had on people’s working lives.
Susan Harkness of the CEP has found that those
employed in services are particularly likely to work part-
time, during the evening or night, and at weekends –
indeed, in 1998 only 51% of employed men and 38% of
women worked full-time for five days a week. More than
one in five private service employees work evenings on a
regular basis, and nearly a third of service workers are
part-time. Women are disproportionately represented in
this sector, and these women are likely to be low paid.
Using data from the Labour Force Survey, Susan
Harkness examined in detail changes in the length of the
working week, times of the day worked, and days of the
week employed. She then went on to look at how the
composition of service sector workers has changed, and
concluded by examining the difference in earnings accord-
ing to the times people work in order to assess whether
those working antisocial hours face a double burden of
low pay and undesirable hours.
Service workers lose out
Throughout the economy hours of work have increased
over the last decade, with more men and women than ever
before doing in excess of 50 hours per week. This is
because overtime has assumed more prominence; and is
especially true in the service sector where the average
number of overtime hours each week has increased from
four to seven in ten years. Service workers are much more
likely to work unpaid overtime than those in manufacturing.
They are also more likely to be low paid if they are
employed at night. These shifts in working patterns have
important considerations both for the organisation of
society, and, given the predominance of women in the
sector, for the organisation of family life. For example,
women with children living in two-parent families are 50%
more likely to work evenings than those without, and in a
quarter of two-parent households at least one parent
regularly works during the evening.
Controlling the workers
One of the striking features of much service sector employ-
ment is the problems employers face in organising and
managing their workers. Richard Coopey, Sean O’Connell
and Dil Porter of the Business History Unit at LSE provided
an illuminating example of this with their historical account
of the development of British mail order retailing in the
twentieth century. Many of the concepts they introduced
found echoes elsewhere in the conference’s consideration
of service sector work. Coopey and his colleagues
described the evolution of a culture of control in the mail
order industry and identified four key stages that carry
labour controls from the era of the family firm through to the
big five mail order companies of the 1990s – companies
such as Littlewoods and GUS – with their massive invest-
ment in computer-enhanced managerialism, especially in
the call centre, nowadays the heart of the mail order opera-
tion. The impact of this latter strategy has been, according
to Coopey et al, to tighten labour control throughout the
entire mail order operation – even including more intense
monitoring of the spare time agent who traditionally enjoyed
a good deal of autonomy. The capacity to impose an
enhanced level of labour control derives from a more 
forceful, market-driven information processing function and
these technological and social aspects of monitoring and
control are fundamental to two others papers presented at
the conference.
Call centres and control
My own work on payment systems in call centres has
seen the ability to monitor input and measure output as
being crucial to the choice of payment system by the firm,
and I have also examined the consequences of such
systems for productivity, financial performance, turnover
and absenteeism. Jeremy Bentham first coined the term
panopticon to denote an ideal prison; Foucault adopted it
as a metaphor for the workplace of the future and our mail
order historians talk about the corporate panopticon in
their work. The concept of control this term implies is also
useful in relation to call centres. As well as being able 
to measure individual contributions, the automatic call
distribution (ACD) technology – which routes calls
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automatically to the next available operator – enables an
accurate assessment to be made of team-working. But 
technical monitoring is not enough to achieve superior
performance. Proper performance appraisal, combined
with real team leadership, allows a qualitative supervisory
dimension to complement the technological measuring and
monitoring. It transpires that those centres with organised
teams where those teams are the unit for reward have
better productivity than centres which rely merely on
individual performance pay.
Services and the minimum wage
Of course, call centre workers enjoy on average rather
higher wages than many service sector workers. They are
likely to retain this edge for the foreseeable future.
However, thanks to a unique experiment in social partner-
ship, nearly 2 million workers will receive on average a
30% pay rise in April when the National Minimum Wage
(NMW) is introduced. Two-thirds of the beneficiaries of the
NMW work in the private service sector. David Metcalf,
himself a member of the Low Pay Commission which
advises on the NMW, has some particularly insightful
observations on low paid occupations, six of which are
found in the service sector. He found that when analysing
why some people are low paid, there appears to be a
specific “occupation effect”, and advances three sets of
reasons to explain this effect on the probability of being low
paid. The first set involve sorting arguments, including low
productivity workers matching themselves with low produc-
tivity firms, or some employees (notably women) having a
taste for low paid work and accepting lower wages accord-
ingly. Second – and here the monitoring problem raises its
head again – it may be that monitoring people in low paid
jobs is easier than many others and therefore there is less
need to pay efficiency (i.e. above the going rate) wages.
Third, the industries may not have any supernormal 
profits to share with employees, and of course, as these
are very low union density firms, there is no union mark 
up here. He also shows, worryingly, that those in one of 
the lowest paid occupations this year are more likely to be
out of work next year than those in other occupations. 
(For a fuller discussion, see the following article by 
David Metcalf.)
The very low paid
Among service workers on the lowest pay scales are those
in residential care homes. The CEP’s Steve Machin and
Alan Manning have therefore been looking at a very
specific labour market, that for care assistants in residen-
tial homes for the elderly on England’s “sunshine coast”.
That sector corresponds closely to economists’ notion of
what should be a competitive labour market, i.e. there is a
large number of small firms undertaking the same job in
concentrated geographical areas, and the employees are
not unionised nor covered by any wage legislation. They
have concluded, however, that the competitive model is
inadequate to explain the very small amount of wage
dispersion there is within firms (or homes in this case) and
the large amount between firms. 
Machin and Manning have also found that what wage
dispersion there is does not seem to be closely related to
the characteristics of workers which would normally be
associated with higher productivity. So they believe that it
is more helpful to think of firms as having considerable
discretion in the setting of wages: these firms choose
simple wage structures, and workers then sort themselves
among firms.
What about the workers?
Workers in care homes tend not to be represented by
unions: and this is typical of many workers in the service
sector, an area which has traditionally been devoid of a
union presence. The TUC is now taking it upon itself – in its
New Unionism campaign – to focus on organising and
recruiting atypical workers, which can mean women, young
workers, or black workers, but can also mean trying to get
a foothold in greenfield sites. At the CEP conference,
Melanie Simms of Cardiff University described a case study
involving the Communication Workers’ Union and its
attempts to organise in a call centre. She was interested in
why the CWU adopted the “organising” approach, which
raises specific issues about the suitability of traditional
union structures for “atypical” workforces, and asked
whether occupational unionism might be another way of
appealing to both employers and employees. In this particu-
lar example, the CWU have successfully recruited more
CentrePiece Spring 199914
We are engaged in “customer service”, and often perform
this role in a purpose-built, aircraft hangar-style, modern
construction, miles away from our customers.
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Workers in care homes tend not to be represented by unions: 
and this is typical of many workers in the service sector, an area
which has traditionally been devoid of a union presence.
than half of the full-time employees; but management are
not considering recognition, nor have they opened a
permanent dialogue with the union.
Sailors do even worse
An altogether bleaker picture of working life was painted by
Tony Lane, also of Cardiff University, in his discussion of
flags of convenience and the global labour market. Ships
and their crews are largely invisible to most of us, even
though they shift some 95% of the world’s internationally
traded raw materials, primary products and manufactured
goods. Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, the
industry was dominated by shipowners based in Europe,
North America and Japan, and was regulated by nationally-
based networks of institutions, legal codes, institutional
rules and normative practices. The rapid growth of flags of
convenience (FOC) from the mid-1970s subverted all
regulation and the greatest impact was on the labour
market. 
Nowadays, the typical crew is multinational; career paths,
conditions of work and shipboard social life, education and
training have all deteriorated sharply. Of the 119 vessels
abandoned since July 1995, 62 were registered in Panama,
the biggest FOC register. Seafarers who work on FOC
ships are often given strict instructions not to make contact
with the International Transport Federation, or are made to
sign contracts in which they promise not to do so. About
half of all seafarers earn less than the ITF’s benchmark
wage (currently US$1,200 per month) and those working
on FOCs face at least twice the risk of being killed at sea
compared with those on board the national flags of
advanced industrial nations.
Hanging on
Given all this, a recent survey carried out by the ITF, in
which seafarers expressed great dissatisfaction with their
pay, promotion prospects and general stress levels hardly
came as a great surprise. So why do sailors stay on in
these conditions? This must be, at least in part, because
23% of seafarers in the survey supported five or more
people on their wages, and more than three quarters
looked after at least
two other people. 
It is hardly any
wonder, then, that
seafarers hang on
to their jobs, whatever the
difficulties. But what about people doing
more ordinary service work? Donna Brown and Steven
McIntosh of the CEP looked at levels of job satisfaction
and at the relationship between satisfaction and turnover in
four other service occupations: hotels, fast food, leisure
and retail. Some of their findings might have been
predicted: the well-educated, for example, are much less
satisfied working in these service sector firms than the less
well-qualified; while people in more senior positions were
more satisfied. But women and older workers were also
likely to be more satisfied. And most surprising was the
apparent absence of any link between job satisfaction and
worker turnover; those dissatisfied at work are no more
likely to leave than their more satisfied colleagues.
All the evidence suggests that private services will continue
to expand well into the next century, both as a share of total
GDP and in the number of people employed in the sector.
As more people are directly and indirectly affected by these
changes in the nature of the economy, the implications for
British employment trends, the role of work organisation
including performance pay and teamwork, and the vexed
question of how to give workers a voice will all assume
increasing importance. The CEP intends to be at the
forefront of the effort to throw more light on these issues.
Sue Fernie is a member of the Firms and Workers
programme at the CEP.
A CEP book on industrial relations in the services sector
will be published next year. 
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Britain’s first National Minimum
Wage will be introduced in April
this year. There has been much
speculation – some of it in
previous issues of CentrePiece –
about the likely impact on
employment and on individuals
currently earning below the £3.60
per hour at which the new
minimum wage will be set. Here,
David Metcalf, Deputy Director 
of the CEP and a member of 
the Low Pay Commission,
assesses the significance of the
minimum wage for workers in 
the service sector.
I
t is hard to overestimate the importance of the National
Minimum Wage for service sector workers. Two thirds
of all those who will benefit from its introduction are in
the private service sector. Low pay in Britain is concen-
trated in a relatively small number of occupations to a
remarkable degree: half of all the low-paid, for example,
are in just six occupations. Why is this so? Part of the
explanation must lie in the fact that these occupations
require less human capital and are found in workplaces
which have characteristics traditionally associated with low
pay – such as few employees and no unions.
But there is also an occupation effect. This can be seen in
what Mark Stewart, its originator, has called the basement
dozen of the pay league: those occupations whose workers
have a much higher probability of being low paid than
workers elsewhere in the economy. Significantly, workers in
these occupations are also more likely to find themselves in
the low pay – no pay cycle: they are more likely to find
themselves out of work than people in other jobs, and the
jobs they do do not currently tend to offer a step up on the
ladder of economic welfare. Understanding this occupation
effect of low pay will, in the long term, be crucial to our
understanding of the impact of the national minimum wage.
The overall impact is clear...
The overall impact of the NMW is set out in Table 1
(overleaf). One employee in 12 – 1.9 million people – will
gain from the NMW receiving, on average, a 30% pay rise.
The cost of bringing these workers up to the NMW is
equivalent to 0.6% of the national wage bill. The proportion
of 18-21 year olds covered (14%) is substantially higher
than that for those aged 22+ (7.8%) and the additions to
the wage bill will be some four times higher for youths than
for adults. Female part-time employees account for over
half of all beneficiaries and the extra wage bill costs for
female and male part-timers is substantially greater than for
full-timers. As we’ve already seen, two thirds of the benefi-
ciaries are in the private service sector.
The 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey also
contains interesting evidence on the incidence of low pay
among workplaces. This evidence refers to a nationally
representative sample of 1,890 workplaces with 25 or more
employees. Low pay is overwhelmingly a private sector
Thewayout?
Low pay and the services sector
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Table 1 Coverage and cost of the National Minimum Wage
Group Numbers affected Percentage of Percentage increase Average increase
(000’s) group affected in wage bill for those affected (%)
All workers 18+ 1,903 8.3 0.6 30
18-21 221 14.0 2.7 30
22+ 1,683 7.8 0.6 30
Male full-time 357 3.2 0.3 -
Male part-time 211 20.5 3.5 -
Female full-time 335 5.6 0.6 -
Female part-time 1,001 19.7 2.7 -
Table 2 Proportions Paid below £3.50 per hour in Selected Occupations
Occupation Prop. Raw difference Adjusted difference
Hairdressers, barbers .587 .523 .346
Waiters, waitresses .562 .498 .336
Bar staff .488 .425 .255
Cleaners, domestics .487 .423 .309
Sewing machinists, menders, darners, etc. .476 .413 .322
Kitchen porters, hands .435 .371 .247
Counterhands, catering assistants .402 .339 .257
Childcare and related occupations n.e.c. .374 .311 .167
Care assistants and attendants (health) .320 .257 .169
Retail cash desk and check-out operators .314 .250 .148
Sales assistants .309 .245 .117
Security guards and related occupations .243 .179 .166
Other occupations .064 – –
All occupations .109 – –
Source: Stewart (1999) from LFS spring 1997. Sample size is 8288 of
which 1,237 individuals are in the 12 lowest paid occupations.
Notes: Table can be interpreted as follows using bar staff as an example:
1. 48.8% of bar staff earn under £3.50 an hour (spring 1997), the
corresponding figure for all occupations is 10.9% and for occupations
other than those in the table is 6.4%.
2. The raw differential in the probability of being paid under £3.50 for bar
staff compared with other occupations is 42.5%.
3. But some of this raw differential is attributable to the various individual 
and workplace characteristics associated with the different 
occupations. The controls are: gender; age; age completed full-time
education; highest qualification equivalent; apprenticeship; marital status;
nationality; ethnic origin; health problems which limit the kind of or amount
of work; hours; contract type; job related training in the last 3 months;
sector; number of employees; shift work; date started with current
employer; region. Once these controls are made the adjusted differential
drops to 25.5%. Thus about one third of the raw differential is 
explained by the other individual and workplace characteristics but two
thirds remain. It seems therefore that there is an occupation specific 
low pay effect. 
We know that workers in unionised establishments
receive higher pay, other things equal, than their
non-unionised counterparts
Source: Report of the Low Pay Commission (1998) table 7.1 updated using
information from April 1998 New Earnings Survey and Spring 1998 Labour
Force Survey.
Notes: Data are based on ONS central method combining information from
the NES and LFS. Rates for April 1999 have been deflated back to Spring
1998 by the forecast change in the RPI to yield benchmarks of £2.90 for
those aged 18-21 and £3.50 for those aged 22+. Alternatively 10p can be
added to the initial 1999 rates so that the NMW figure of £3.60 is equivalent
to an average earnings figure of £3.70 reflecting e.g. overtime and shift
premia and the London allowance. The £3.70 can then be deflated by the
AEI, which again translates into an earnings figure of £3.50 in Spring 1998.
phenomenon: 93% of public sector workplaces had no
workers earning below £3.50 an hour in 1998 (roughly
equivalent to the £3.60 an hour NMW from April 1999) and
only 1% had a quarter or more of their workforce earning
below it, compared with 13% of private sector workplaces.
Within the private sector it is heavily clustered: in the
WERS sample there were no workplaces in electricity, gas
and water, transport and communications, and financial
services where a quarter of the workforce are paid below
£3.50 an hour. By the same measure, half of all workplaces
in the hotel and restaurant industry had a quarter or more of
the workforce earning less than this at the time of the
survey. Workplaces where unions were recognised were
much less likely than their non-union counterparts to have a
quarter of their workforce earning below £3.50 an hour. 
...as is its impact on some occupations
But it’s the potential impact of the NMW on certain jobs
which is most striking. Low pay is remarkably concentrated
by occupation. Evidence from the 1998 New Earnings
Survey for all employees (full-time and part-time) shows that
over one third of adults earning less than £3.50 an hour are
cleaners, sales assistants and bar staff; yet these occupa-
tions only account for 9% of all employment. Further, half of
all the low paid are in just six occupations – the bottom
three plus care assistants, counterhands and kitchen
porters and hands. 
Table 2 sets out this occupation effect, focusing on the
basement dozen of the pay league. For all occupations the
proportion earning below £3.50 is 10.9%. For the
basement dozen it ranges from 58.7% for hairdressers to
24.3% to security guards. In all occupations other than
these, only 6.4% of workers earn below £3.50 an hour. The
second column presents the raw differential between the
probability of low pay in the specific occupation (e.g. 0.587
for hairdressers) and all other occupations (0.064). [See
the Table notes for an explanation of these terms]. But how
much of this raw difference is accounted for by the charac-
teristics both of the workers in and workplaces employing
the people in these occupations? This is investigated by
controlling for many such factors [also explained in the
Table 2 notes]. The answer is remarkably little. Controlling
for age, education, tenure, gender, nationality, health,
hours, region, workplace size and so on typically reduces
the raw differential by only around one third. The adjusted
differential in the probability of low pay is, in most occupa-
tions, around two thirds of the raw differential. In other
words, employees in these occupations are still far more
likely to be low paid than those in the base group.
Easy to identify – but hard to explain
All this suggests that there is an ‘occupation-specific’ effect
on the probability of low pay. Explaining this effect,
however, is far more difficult. One obvious factor could be
related to measurement of this effect: it is probable that the
control variables do not fully capture either the differences
in productivity among individuals or the characteristics of
the workplace which affect pay. 
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Those in one of the 12 low paid occupations 
one year ago are more likely to be out of work 
now than those in other occupations.
Workers in these occupations are also
more likely to find themselves in the low
pay – no pay cycle: they are more likely
to find themselves out of work than
people in other jobs, and the jobs they do
do not currently tend to offer a step 
up on the ladder of economic welfare.
But that is unlikely to be the whole story. It could also be
that, on the demand-side, many smaller firms use labour
inefficiently making, for example, few investments in staff
development. On the supply-side those with low ability or
motivation – some of which is not captured by the controls
– will gravitate to such firms. These two factors taken
together imply that these occupations have low productivity
and hence low pay. It is noticeable how few workers in
these occupations receive incentive pay. Perhaps less able
workers gravitate to firms using time rates.
Another explanation is that many female employees with
children require part-time work which is near home (i.e.
they are drawn from a limited geographic labour market).
This gives the employers some monopsony power over
such employees in these basement dozen occupations; the
result is low pay. It is also possible that workers in these
occupations are prepared to take lower pay because they
receive pleasure from caring for the elderly or dealing with
the general public. Thus they accept a (negative) compen-
sating wage differential to work in these occupations.
Easy and cheap to control
Monitoring of worker performance could also play a role.
There are two main ways of eliciting effort from employees:
either they can be given incentives in the form of higher
pay; or more resources can be devoted to supervision and
monitoring their behaviour. For most of these very low paid
occupations it is probably straightforward to monitor
employees’ behaviour. The jobs are very well defined and
involve only modest discretion. Therefore, as compared
with occupations higher up the pay league table, there is
less need to pay more in these occupations to elicit effort.
Moreover, this effect is likely to be compounded by the fact
that supervisors’ time in these lower level occupations may
not be very valuable. By contrast, managers’ time in other
sectors or organisations is more valuable, so these other
occupations are maybe inclined to pay more to elicit effort.
This latter effect may be compounded by outsourcing. Take
cleaning and security for example. Firms increasingly find it
cheaper to outsource cleaning and security to business
service companies like Rentokil, Initial and Pinkerton.
Managers’ time in these sub-contractors is less valuable
than it is in, for example, a bank or a hospital and therefore
Rentokil’s managers are able to devote more time to
monitoring their staff. This leads to the prediction that for a
specific occupation – say cleaners or security guards –
those employed by a contractor would, other things equal,
be paid less than those employed directly by the firm.
Evidence from Incomes Data Services tentatively confirms
this prediction.
Firms’ concern for their reputation may also be important. It
is sometimes asserted (see e.g. The Economist, 30 May
1998) that managers in some firms wish to develop reputa-
tions for paying their subordinates well – perhaps because
such a reputation enhances loyalty and commitment. It is
possible that such reputation effects are less important –
particularly among small firms – in sectors like hospitality,
retail, contract cleaning and security.
Industrial effects may be part of the story
It is well-known that there is an industry effect on pay, often
explained by firms sharing any extra profits with their
employees. Many of these occupations are industry-
specific: including hairdressing, sales assistants, care
assistants, waiters/waitresses and bar staff (but not clean-
ers or security guards). These industry-specific occupa-
tions are in industries which surely have no rent to share:
their product markets are very competitive and labour costs
are a high fraction of total cost. Hence they languish at the
bottom of the occupation league table with their own
occupation-specific effect mirroring the industry-specific
effect.
Unionisation – or lack of it – is also potentially a significant
factor. We know that workers in unionised establishments
receive higher pay, other things equal, than their non-
unionised counterparts. The levels of unionisation among
these occupations is very low: for example in the private
sector, only 5% of workers in hospitality are union members:
the figure for business services is 8% and in retail it is 10%.
Therefore fewer employees in our basement dozen occupa-
tions receive the pay premium associated with union recog-
nition than do those in many more highly paid occupations,
and this contributes to these basement occupations having
a higher probability of low pay. 
A vicious circle
These basement dozen occupations play an important role
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Low pay is overwhelmingly a private sector phenomenon: 93% of public sector workplaces
had no workers earning below £3.50 an hour in 1998 and only 1% had a quarter or more of
their workforce earning below it, compared with 13% of private sector workplaces.
The claim by the Low Pay Commission that 
‘the pressure to restore pay differentials
following its introduction will be limited and
localised’ is likely to prove correct.
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in the low pay – no pay cycle. For example Mark Stewart in
a forthcoming book reports that 29% of those not working
a year ago are now employed in one of these 12 occupa-
tions, compared with only 13% of those who were already
in work a year ago. Looking at it the other way round, those
in one of the 12 low paid occupations one year ago, are
more likely to be out of work now than those in other
occupations. This would perhaps be less of a cause for
concern if the low paid jobs are a stepping stone to higher
paid jobs. But they do not appear to be. Those in the
basement dozen in 1997 are less likely to be paid above
£3.50 in 1998 than those out of work in 1997. As Stewart
puts it, ‘this suggests that low paid jobs are more likely to
act as blind alleys than as stepping stones to positions
higher up the pay distribution’.
So how will these sectors
respond to the minimum wage?
The Bank of England discussed the NMW in its August
1998 Inflation Report and was reasonably sanguine about
its impact. This was partly because it expected many
organisations to adjust to the NMW prior to April 1999
and because it did not anticipate any serious knock-on
effects higher up the pay distribution caused by restoration
of pay differentials for those above the minimum wage.
Provisional evidence suggests that the Bank’s expecta-
tions are correct.
Hospitality is the sector with the highest incidence of low
pay. The distributions of hourly earnings in that sector in
1997 and 1998 are shown in Figure 1. There is already
evidence – one year before its implementation – of a remark-
able spike in the distribution around £3.60 such that almost a
tenth of workers in that industry now receive the NMW.
Panel data from the NES for workers in the same job in
1997 and 1998 also shows that median earnings rose
more between April 1997 and April 1998 for those earning
below £3.50 an hour in 1997 than for all other pay bands.
The rise in median earnings gradually tapers off up to about
£7. Although we shall need to wait for the actual implemen-
tation of the NMW, this evidence tentatively suggests that
the claim by the Low Pay Commission that ‘the pressure to
restore pay differentials following its introduction will be
limited and localised’ is likely to prove correct. But for low-
paid workers within the service industries the impact will be
far more significant and beneficial.
David Metcalf has drawn on the first Report of the Low Pay
commission and subsequent documents in preparing this article.
He wishes to acknowledge the contribution of fellow
Commissioners and the LPC Secretariat whose ideas and
research are reported here. 
Further reading
Bank of England (1998), ‘The National Minimum Wage and other
labour market reforms’, Quarterly Bulletin, August.
Low Pay Commission (1998), The National Minimum Wage, 
First Report of LPC, Cmnd 3976, London: Stationary Office, July.
Stewart, M. ‘Low pay in Britain: piecing together the picture’, in 
P. Gregg and J. Wadsworth (eds) The State of Working Britain,
Manchester University Press, forthcoming in 1999.
Figure 1 Distribution of hourly earnings in Hospitality




















Source: NES, all employees aged 18 or over whose pay was unaffected by absence
Those in one of the 12 low paid occupations one year ago are more
likely to be out of work now than those in other occupations.
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n the late summer of 1998, the
financial crisis emanating from
East Asia spread to Russia and
then Latin America. With the US
threatened by a possible widespread
credit crunch, the Federal Reserve
was prompted to cut interest rates
three times in seven weeks between
the end of September and 
mid-November. The Bank of England
followed suit, cutting the base rate 
in October for the first time since
independence. In a more unexpected
move, the euro-11 countries also 
co-ordinated to cut rates on 3
December to 3% (except for Italy,
which lowered rates to 3.5%) ahead
of the official birth of the euro. 
Responding to this monetary
loosening, share prices rebounded
strongly. The danger of a major
credit crunch started to abate as
credit spreads narrowed; so too, 
did the immediate danger of a global
recession. At the low point in
October, the global loss of financial
wealth, relative to the peak in July,
was estimated at $2.3 trillion
(equivalent to 19% of OECD
consumer expenditure). Share prices
subsequently rallied rapidly, with the
Dow Jones Industrial Average
crossing the 9500 level for the first
time on 6 January this year.
Even so, with one third of the world
economy already in recession, the UK
cannot be immune from direct trade
effects. UK exporters, already
struggling with the strong pound,
have seen their plight aggravated by
the deepening of the international
crisis over the past year. Not only do
they see foreign demand dwindling,
they also face intense price
competition from the crisis economies
in third country markets. Presence in
overseas markets can only be
maintained with a tight squeeze on
profit margins. Domestic producers
also find competition from imports
intensified. At the time of writing,
there is not much sign that these
pressures will ease in the near future.
The crisis-stricken regions will
continue to experience sluggish
growth this year. According to the
December Consensus Forecasts, the
Asia-Pacific region is expected to
grow at 0.5% this year, compared
with a fall in output of 1.8% in 1998.
Growth in Latin America, by contrast,
is going to slow further from 2.4% in
1998 to 0.8% this year – a forecast
made before the latest crisis in Brazil.
This compares with 5.2% in 1997
before the crisis struck the region.
Russia will continue to experience
decline, with GDP falling by 6% for
the second year running in 1999.
Trade is also indirectly affected. The
rate of growth in world trade
probably halved from 9.5% in 1997
to 4-5% in 1998 and global output
growth reached only 2%, compared
with the long-term trend of 3.4%.
This second order effect may have
partly explained Britain’s widening
overall trade gap from a small
surplus in the third quarter of 1997
to a deficit of £1.8 billion a year later.
Riding the global 
financial storm
1998 was an unusually turbulent year in the
international financial markets and the UK is
not immune from its impact, which is chiefly
transmitted via two channels: trade links and
financial links. Guest Columnist Kate Barker,
Chief Economist of the Confederation of
British Industry, argues that although the 
risk of an outright global recession has
receded, 1999 is still going to be a tough 
year for the UK economy. 
GUEST COLUMN
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The outlook for the world economy in
1999 is grim with the IMF now
forecasting world growth to be only
2.5%, up slightly on last year but still
well below the actual growth of
4.1% in 1997. Even in the euro area,
where growth will remain relatively
robust, the rate will slow from 2.9%
in 1998 closer to 2.0% in 1999.
Against this background, the CBI
forecasts that the UK visible trade
deficit as a percentage of GDP will
widen to 2.7% and 2.9% in 1999
and 2000 respectively.
As net exports have become a drag
on growth in many industrial
countries, the West has increasingly
relied on domestic demand to
support overall growth. A slump in
the financial markets and a
widespread credit crunch, which
would undermine consumers’
confidence and investment
intentions, would therefore have
plunged the global economy into
recession. Although the recent
normalisation in many financial
markets has provided reasons for
relief, events in Brazil have shown
that the crisis is far from over and a
return to trend growth may be
delayed. Indeed, it is likely that in
1999 the OECD countries will
witness rationalisation and
restructuring in many industries such
as steel, automotives and parts of
the electronics and chemicals sector.
Adjustment to over-capacity in these
sectors world-wide is more likely to
come in industrial countries than in
the newly-industrialised regions. In
the EU, this process may well be
given an added impetus by the
competitive pressures linked to the
arrival of the euro.
This gloomy sentiment is reflected in
the UK business surveys, which have
shown a collapse in business
confidence in recent months,
compared to levels recorded in the
previous recession. According to the
CBI Industrial Trends Survey,
confidence fell sharply in the latter
half of 1998 - October, for instance,
showed a more pessimistic reading
than was recorded in the depths of
the 1990/91 recession. Firms were
certainly influenced by gloomy media
commentary, but a similar picture is
also painted for consumer
confidence about the general
economic situation. Deterioration of
this magnitude is not typical and
suggests that a sharp slowdown is
now in store during the coming
months. The CBI has revised
downward its growth forecasts from
1.2% to 0.7% for 1999, which
includes zero growth for the first two
quarters. Although the economy as a
whole may just avoid a technical
recession, manufacturers at least
look set to face four more quarters of
falling output, with related cuts in
investment and jobs.
By cutting interest rates again in
early January, the Bank of England
had in four months more than
reversed the rises in interest rates
introduced from May 1997 to June
1998. Yet there is still concern that
this will not be able to ward off
recession, in the face of these 
dire warnings concerning the
economy. Economic weakness 
now seems to be spreading out 
well beyond manufacturing. Surveys
of the service sector, including
financial services, increasingly
indicate that these firms are
preparing for a sharp slowdown in
demand growth. An outright
recession in the UK seems unlikely,
but a prolonged period of slow
growth is probable, as the traded
sector of the economy restructures. 
by Kate Barker
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Kate Barker is Chief Economist 
of the CBI.
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ne of the obsessions of late twentieth
century society is economic growth: right
across the world, politicians, economists
and ordinary citizens, from rich countries
and poor, all want to know how they can
become better off. Growth is seen as a vital
measure of economic success and a huge amount of
research effort is expended in trying to work out what
makes economies grow – and how to make them grow
even faster.
For much of this century, redistribution – ensuring that
everyone became better off – was seen as an important
element in measuring economic success. But in the 1980s
in particular, it became fashionable for some politicians and
economists to argue that inequality could be positively good
for growth. In Thatcherite Britain, the economy and its
productiveness grew at a time when inequality (as
measured by the gap between the very richest and the very
poorest) increased sharply. The one seemed to be a price
for the other. President Reagan came to office in the US in
1981 armed with the so-called trickle down theory: let rich
people get richer and everyone would benefit as their
wealth ‘trickled down’ the economic ladder.
In Britain, then, economic success as measured by the
growth in the economy appears to have been bought at the
price of greater inequality. But does economic inequality
within a country really provide the best framework for
economic growth in the future? Does inequality spur
growth or hinder it as some recent research suggests?
These are questions at the heart of modern government
policy. Should countries be thinking in terms of dismantling
their welfare states because greater inequality would
promote growth; or improving the redistribution of income
and wealth because the reverse is true?
Even the theory is changing
Inequality and growth are inextricably linked. The distin-
guished British economist Nicholas Kaldor observed that
those who owned capital tend to be richer than those who
rely exclusively on labour for their incomes: this suggested
that savings out of capital income should exceed savings
out of labour income. In this way the rich would grow
relatively richer; increases in income inequality would result
in higher savings, and, if these savings were then invested
in a productive way, would subsequently lead to higher
growth. In other words, more unequal societies were likely
to grow faster.
Neither a borrower nor a lender be?
Recent work on this link has focused on two different
channels by which inequality affects growth. The first is a
result of what are known as agency problems. These arise
when one or more individuals contract with one another
under conditions of imperfect information. Take, for
example, an investor who knows about a good investment
opportunity, but hasn’t the money to take advantage of it:
that person needs, therefore, to borrow money from
someone else. It is reasonable to suppose our borrower
knows more about the investment opportunity than the
person making the loan. It is also difficult for the lender to
check whether the borrower has been sufficiently careful –
with money that at the end of the day belongs to someone
else – in watching over the investment: this is known as the
problem of moral hazard. After all, the lender will enjoy part
Does inequality mean
slow growth?
By Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess
Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess challenge those who argue that
inequality is the price of economic success in the modern world
of the return on the investment – he or she will be repaid
with interest if it is a successful venture; the borrower
therefore has less incentive to make it work than if none of
the money was borrowed. 
If such imperfections in contracting relationships abound,
then inequality can affect levels of output. To see this,
contrast a world in which individuals decide to finance new
investment projects out of their own resources and those
where they must resort to bank lending. At one extreme,
none of the agency problems outlined above will arise – the
investor and the financier are one and the same. At the
other extreme, the investor has no resources to commit to
the project: ultimately the lender is taking all the risk, and
doing so on the basis of imperfect information. Some of
these investments will go wrong – they won’t produce a
return on the money invested. The more of their own money
which investors put into a project, the better the return is
likely to be. The more equal a society is, the more likely it is
potential investors will be able to offer sufficient collateral
from their own resources to mitigate these agency
problems. This suggests that, other things being the same,
more equal societies should find better investment opportu-
nities and thus grow more. 
In other words, it is quite possible that societies which
embark on a policy of wholesale redistribution could reap
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Figure 1 Difference between rural and urban poverty plotted against land reform activity
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the reward in the form of higher output. Far from being
seen as a drag on economic performance, the modern
welfare state can therefore be seen as a vital mechanism
which fosters growth. 
The political impact of inequality
Other recent work has emphasised the impact of inequality
on growth through the political system. Extreme inequality
can foster all manner of activities – riots, protests and so on
– which disrupt production. In a democracy, the level of
taxation is determined by voting decisions and redistributive
taxation is often conceived as the legitimate mechanism by
which inequality is reduced. The more unequal the society
the greater will be the range of opinion about the desirabil-
ity of redistribution. 
Take a country comprised of three groups – poor, middle
class and rich. The poor in an unequal society see large
gains from high taxation on the rich. The rich fear higher
taxes if the poor gain political control. Many voting theories
suggest that such conflicts will often be resolved by what
the middle classes want – they represent a compromise
that should be voted for ahead of the preferred outcome of
either the poor or the. How much the middle classes will
want to redistribute depends, first, on their own income
level – whether they are closer to being rich or poor – and,
In the 1980s in particular, it became fashionable for
some politicians and economists to argue that inequality










Using the data available to construct measures of inequality
over time – the most complete cross-country date covers
49 countries for the period 1947-94 – reveals two key
features. First, levels of inequality vary significantly across
different countries: they are highest in Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa and lowest in the industrial countries of
the OECD, with the countries of East and South Asia
somewhere in the middle. The range of variation is smaller
across Indian states during the 1958 – 1992 period, but is
nonetheless considerable. 
Secondly, the evidence suggests that inequality measures
within countries or regions are relatively stable across time.
Thus we find that 91.8 % of the variance is cross-country
variance whilst only 0.85 % is over-time variance. For India,
the figures are 65.2 % variance across states and 9.3 %
over-time. The fact that inequality has been relatively stable
across time whereas different countries and states have
been growing at different rates over the same period
suggests that there is no systematic relationship between
inequality and income. This is demonstrated graphically for
Indian states in Figure 1.
But the relative stability of income distributions across time
does not mean public policy is neutral in its impact on
growth and poverty: there may be direct effects, but there
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second, how much they are likely to gain levying taxes on
the rich – which would depend on how rich the rich really
are, and how successfully they can avoid higher taxes. The
larger the gap between the middle class and the rich, the
higher the levels of redistributive taxation the middle classes
are likely to vote for. But these levels of taxation will affect
incentives to invest and could have a negative impact 
of growth. 
Does the evidence support the theory?
Both these theoretical arguments suggest that inequality at
the outset is bad for growth. But how do they relate to the
real world? Much effort has been expended over the last
few years in trying to bridge the gap between the far reach-
ing implications of the theoretical literature and the much
more limited empirical evidence actually available to test the
theories. 
Most existing empirical evidence comes from cross-country
data. While this can be informative, there are significant
problems in trying to compare data across countries and in
trying to work out the directions of causation. But it’s possi-
ble to supplement such data with evidence with data from
one country, India, where data on the distribution has been
collected in a similar fashion in each Indian state over a
long period of time. 
Does economic inequality within a country really provide the best
framework for economic growth in the future? Does inequality spur 










may also be a lot of changes taking place within a distribu-
tion which are not immediately apparent. Understanding
how particular forms of redistribution affect economic
performance and welfare is therefore crucial. 
Inequality matters
So far most of the work has concentrated on how initial
inequality (in other words, the level of inequality at
whatever point we choose to start from and which is itself
the result of historical policy choices) affects economic
performance. The level of initial inequality is thus viewed
as a potential determinant of growth. Overall, these
cross-country studies suggest that initial inequality
depresses subsequent growth and investment. This
suggests that countries which pursued policies to
equalise incomes did reap some benefit in terms of future
growth. But this relationship is relatively weak. The
negative effect of initial inequality on growth is stronger if
we use as a measure inequality in the form of assets
(such as land, for example) in place of income. How
inequality is measured is therefore crucial – and this has a
direct bearing on how to choose the most appropriate
policy to affect it. The distribution of assets (whether
physical or human) which strongly affect earning potential
over the life cycle seem to be a more important determi-
nant of the future economic performance of a country
than the distribution of current income. 
But how?
The central question remains: what is the mechanism
through which an unequal initial distribution of assets or
income might affect subsequent growth? If it is political –
that poor people may vote in favour of redistributive taxes
that reduce investment incentives – then we would expect
three things: higher taxes and lower investment in democ-
ratic as opposed to undemocratic countries; a positive
relationship between inequality and redistribution; and a
negative effect on growth from redistribution (using
welfare transfers and education expenditure as proxies).
None of these relationships are borne out in cross-
country data. 
Not all redistribution is equal
The suggestion from the data that certain forms of redis-
tribution can increase output more than others represents
a shift away from the presumption that all forms of
government intervention in the economy entail a trade-off
between equity and efficiency. Where access to credit is
conditional on ownership of assets, and if certain invest-
ments in physical or human capital (for example, in basic
education) are affected by individuals’ access to credit
markets, then the distribution of assets in an economy, in
addition to the average income, will determine how many
people are able to undertake such investments. 
The more unequal the economy, the fewer the number of
people able to make such investments in physical or
human capital: which would result in lower stocks of such
capital and, as a consequence, lower growth. 
Three pieces of evidence from the cross-country data
provide support for this line of argument. First, increasing
credit availability and redistribution (for example, of 
human capital or physical assets) tend to increase
growth. Second, the negative impact of initial inequality
(measured by ownership of land) on subsequent 
growth can be identified in developing but not in devel-
oped countries. This makes sense given that credit
constraints are less important in developed countries,
land is no longer important as a form of collateral, 
and poverty is rarely a reason for non-attendance at
primary schools. 
Finally, it appears that initial (land) inequality is signifi-
cantly and negatively related to the average educational
attainment in the population. The lower the educational
standards in a country, the more unequal the distribution
of land ownership is likely to be. Taken together, these
observations suggest that the credit markets, not the
political system, are more likely to be the mechanism
through which inequality slows economic growth.
Redistributive policy
So what are the implications of all this for policymakers?
Research is now concentrated on three aspects of this
debate. There is an increasing preoccupation with how
particular forms of redistribution, as opposed to inequality
per se, affect growth. Different redistributive policies may
It is quite possible that societies which embark on a policy of wholesale redistribution could reap
the reward in the form of higher output. Far from being seen as a drag on economic performance,
the modern welfare state can therefore be seen as a vital mechanism which fosters growth. 
The lower the educational
standards in a country, the more
unequal the distribution of land
ownership is likely to be. 
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have effects on growth (and poverty) which are indepen-
dent of the overall level of inequality. There is also a shift
away from using cross-country data because of the diffi-
culty of making sensible comparisons between different
measures of inequality. Data on regions within a given
country where data has been gathered in a consistent
fashion and where there are fewer problems in comparing
across institutions and types of state intervention often offer
the best way forward. And there is an increasing tendency
to look at the effects of a particular form of redistribution on
both growth and poverty. This is a driven by recognition
that a given intervention may have different effects on
poverty and growth and the pattern of effects may vary by
type of intervention. 
Taking this tack allows us to begin to rethink the design of
redistributive policy. The challenge is to identify those forms
of government intervention which improve both economic
performance and improve welfare. These tend to be those
that redistribute opportunity (in terms of access to basic
health and education and the acquisition of assets, credit
and employment) thus allowing individuals or households to
participate more fully in the economy. This new thinking
partly explains why there has, in developing countries, been
a shift away from tax/transfer programmes towards land
reform, promotion of small-scale industry, expansion of
basic health and education and micro-lending as the major
focus of redistributive efforts.
Land reform in India
India offers an excellent chance to study how such
approaches can work in practice; the progress of land
reform there is particularly illuminating. Data on poverty and
inequality have been gathered over a long period in India,
using the same methods in each state. The states also
have a great deal of autonomy and have been free to intro-
duce different forms of land reform, with significant varia-
tion across states and time. And besides being home to a
significant fraction of the poor in the developing world,
India, in the post-Independence period, experienced the
most extensive land reform legislation ever to have been
passed in so short a period in any country. 
We found that states with more land reforms have experi-
enced greater reductions in rural poverty. This is clearly
illustrated in Figure 2: the vertical axis shows a measure of
the difference between rural and urban poverty, while the
horizontal axis gives the number of land reforms that a state
has in a particular year and state. Using the difference
between rural and urban poverty is a particularly persuasive
way of looking at the data since, unlike the level of poverty,
there is no downward trend over time in this variable.
Hence, we can be sure that land reform is not just picking
up a trend linked to a specific state.
Perhaps even more interesting is that the pattern of effects
on poverty and growth were mixed across different types
of land reform. There was some suggestion of an equity-
efficiency trade-off for tenancy reforms (which involved
changing the terms of the contract between landlord and
tenant) since both poverty and output per capita are lower
after such reforms have been introduced. No such trade-
off emerges for the abolition of intermediaries (sub-
landlords which extracted tax for the British and rent for
the landlord) – poverty is reduced but growth is
unaffected. Ceilings on land holdings (where land holdings
above the stipulated ceiling are redistributed) do not seem
to have an effect on either output measures or poverty,
while land consolidation (where disparate plots are
amalgamated) promotes output increases in agriculture
without having any impact on poverty. 
The challenge for the future
It seems clear, contrary to some hitherto fashionable ideas,
that inequality can have a deleterious impact on growth
prospects both in the developed and the developing world.
The challenge is to identify those policies which have the
best chance of achieving both objectives – faster growth
and less inequality – at the same time.
Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Deputy
Chairman of the Suntory-Toyota International Centre for
Economics and Related Disciplines; Robin Burgess is lecturer in
Development Economics at the LSE and a Fellow of STICERD.
The distribution of assets (whether physical or human) which strongly affect earning
potential over the life cycle seem to be a more important determinant of the future
economic performance of a country than the distribution of current income.
Figure 2 Difference between rural and urban poverty
plotted against land reform activity














n almost every area of economic
activity, being clear on who owns
what is a pretty effective way to
guarantee reasonable outcomes.
Property rights provide incentives for
ensuring the continued production
and distribution of goods and
services that society values. Indeed,
some identify the mainspring of
economic growth to be property
rights which make socially productive
activity worthwhile.
Less grandiose examples abound.
Those owning their own homes
maintain the property better than
those renting a hotel room; those
driving their own cars take better
care than when driving a rental.
When employees run the business –
whether it is Britain’s John Lewis
chain of retail stores or a family-run
corner shop – chances are they will
have the greater incentive to make
the business succeed, by working
harder or being more ingenious at
solving the day-to-day problems that
come up. Shirking is reduced; gains
and losses are made transparent.
The logic extends more generally.
Households that form part of a
coherent community watch out for
the well-being of everyone in the
community. Engineers with stock
options in a software company are
Danny Tyson Quah
Property rights underly the workings of almost
all economic life. In the weightless economy,
however, property is intellectual property – not
the same as scientific knowledge, perhaps, but
intellectual property nonetheless, in having all
the same physical and economic properties as
knowledge. What difference does this make to
economic performance? In his regular column
Danny Tyson Quah
asserts the changes
will be large, and lays




need to make. 
Weightless Property
driven to work hundreds of hours a
week to guarantee delivery of a
successful product. Firms and
workers that have a stake in society
are supposed to perform better all
around: by not littering city streets;
by contributing charitably to the
museums, opera, and ballet; by
fighting the temptation to succumb to
road rage. 
Property is property
This alignment of actions and
incentives makes so much sense that
it pervades thinking even where its
utility might be less clearcut. Slap the
word intellectual in front of property
rights: why should anything change?
Intellectual property rights (IPRs)
increasingly form the touchstone of
success in the weightless economy.
IPR activity here ranges from the
grab for namespace on the World
Wide Web to US TRIPS (Trade-
Related aspects of Intellectual
Property Right) litigation to the
software industry’s estimated
worldwide loss of US$11.4 billion in
1997 from illegal software copying.
While US retailing loses less than
2% of total sales from shoplifting,
bootlegged business software in the
US alone costs that industry over
25% of sales. That figure is 32% in
Japan and 96% in China (making for
dollar losses of US$0.8 billion and
US$1.4 billion, respectively, in 1997).
Two forces are at work here. First, it
is the nature of weightless economy
products that they can be easily
copied. But copying alone need not
be enough. Having a copy of the
music, video, or electronic game on
disk without being able to use it
doesn’t do the consumer much good
(and there are many more consumers
than there are businesses). So, the
second: technology now facilitates
the consumption and use of
weightless-economy products to a
degree where their easy copying
actually makes a perceptible
economic difference.
The end result is, as Thomas
Jefferson two centuries ago saw, not
of computer software or pop music,
but of knowledge and ideas: that
they are “incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation”, or are
infinitely expansible – the classical
IPR problem. But while Thomas
Jefferson and earlier writers could
confine these worries to the relatively
remote realms of the inventor, then,
factory-floor innovation, and much
later to R&D labs, the weightless
economy takes them directly to the
consumer. It might irk purists that I
say the Beastie Boys and the Spice
Girls generate intellectual property,
but it’s true – in that their weightless-
economy output has all the same
physical and economic properties as
does scientific knowledge. The same
goes for computer software, video
games, movies.
The IPR problem is therefore
intensified in the weightless
economy. With intellectual property
rights at best insecure, what remains
of incentive to develop and maintain
intellectual assets? Proponents for
stronger IPR regimes go further: for
them, the current system not only
destroys the will to innovate, it also
reduces R&D resources overall and
depletes tax revenues. These
arguments make their case on behalf
of gains for society as a whole. But
narrower, less altruistic ones can be
developed. If the British medical
establishment is averse on grounds
of "morality" to patenting its
discoveries, then American business
is more than willing to do so.
Perversely, we then end up paying to
use something that was ours in the
first place.
There’s a trade-off
Whether or not morality means
anything, certain types of intellectual
property do differ from property 
more generally.
To decide if society enjoys enough
economic activity of a particular kind,
we weigh up marginal benefits and
marginal costs. When the former
exceeds the latter, society will gain
when there is more of the activity in
question. We can apply this principle
to agricultural production, the
manufacturing sector, the Spice
Girls, even the number of academics
working in economics departments.
For infinitely expansible intellectual
property, marginal costs are zero 
ex post, i.e., immediately after its
initial creation. But then as long as
society continues to benefit from
having yet another copy of that asset,
we should instruct the owners of an
intellectual asset to flood the market
with their asset at zero price.
Wholesale expropriation is one way
to describe this, but unfettered
competition would work too. The
different phrases, of course, give
entirely different spins on, in this
case, exactly the same outcome.
The obvious problem arises once
one thinks through the dynamics.
Forward-looking putative creators of
intellectual assets see that
expropriation is what will happen,
and, sensibly enough, demur. What
is good for society ex post is not
similarly so for the individual ex ante.
Creative people will find plenty of
other uses for their time and energy.
The result: no intellectual assets are
produced.
To get around this, systems of
intellectual property rights prevent
unfettered competition by awarding a
monopoly to the private creator of an
intellectual asset. Any effective IPR
system necessarily reflects a choice
society has made about the trade-off
between ex ante incentives and ex
post inefficiencies. Those arguing for
strong IPR protection must estimate
ex post inefficiencies to be relatively
unimportant; those agitating for weak
IPR protection must believe ex ante
incentives will be relatively
undiminished. Unlike property rights
in many other areas of economic life,
intellectual property rights are not an
unalloyed good thing.
This observation has unexpected
implications. For one, it lends
circumspection to policy-makers’
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With intellectual property
rights at best insecure, 
what remains of incentive 
to develop and maintain
intellectual assets?
Some identify the mainspring
of economic growth to 
be property rights which
make socially productive
activity worthwhile.
using patent counts and copyright
licensing revenues to measure
economic performance. Observed
patterns of patent renewals and
patent/R&D expenditure ratios could
well give insight on how valuable and
effective intellectual property and
R&D are to an individual firm. They
give no insight, however, on national
economic performance: are
consumer and producer welfare
jointly maximized? In the reasoning
above, higher patent counts simply
mean ever greater social
inefficiencies, and thus reduced
consumer surplus.
Almost by definition, then, there
cannot be one absolutely
unambiguous and definitive argument
for strengthening regimes for
protecting intellectual property rights.
Or for weakening them.
The real world
But what about the specifics? Most
official intellectual property takes the
form of copyright and patents.
Software has, historically, been
protected by copyright, not patent.
Software is, therefore, legally the
same as a literary work. Copyright
protects an author’s expression of an
underlying set of ideas, but not the
ideas themselves. Under most
current legal systems, copyright is
routinely awarded to any work
showing originality, i.e., the work
must not have been copied, and
must have had sufficient amount of
labour, skill, and judgement involved
in its production. Put differently, the
work must have been the author’s
own creation.
Implicit in this is the understanding
that there must be more than one
way to implement an idea – for
otherwise any copyrighted work
could not have been the author’s
own creation. Indeed, under
copyright, others can freely copy
portions of a work that are “critical”,
i.e., for which only one way 
exists to implement the idea. 
In principle then, except through 
sheer bulk of overlaying detail, 
good ideas do not get held up
by copyright monopoly.
Easy enough for me to say lightly. But
Hollywood and the publishing, arts,
and software industries on the one
hand and consumer advocates on the
other take copyright protection very
seriously indeed. To the degree that
economic growth continues to be
driven by technology – as it always
has been – and to the extent that new
technology more and more appears
in copyrighted (not patented)
software, ordinary copyright
protection might not be strong
enough for society’s own good.
Or too strong, depending on how
you look at it. Consumers are not
concerned the same way rival
producers are about being able to
extract, for their own use, the critical
good idea embedded in a copyright
work but unprotected by law.
Consumers just want to enjoy the
entire work conveniently. This act is
impossible to perform without, in
effect, making a copy – albeit
temporarily – and thus infringing 
the rights of reproduction on a
copyright work.
Patents differ from copyright in
requiring that an invention be novel,
capable of industrial application, and
innovative relative to the current state
of the art; they are therefore a
stronger form of intellectual property
protection than copyright. The
definition seems to exclude, say,
mathematical formulas and abstract
models, and as already noted,
computer software historically.
But the underlying bases for legal
decisions can drift as understanding
changes, even when sometimes the
resulting economic benefits might not
be completely transparent. By the
late 1980s, the Karmakar linear
programming algorithm had become,
in effect, protected by patent. In
1998 the US Patent and Trademark
Office began awarding patents for
electronic-commerce business
models, reasoning they were
performed on computers and thus
were industrial, machine-driven
processes. Indeed, a recent decision
awarded a patent to, essentially, a
mathematical formula for dividing up
administrative costs on a portfolio of
mutual funds. Because the formula
was computerized – the computer
was made part of the invention – 
and since US law allows patenting of
the entire package, a mathematical
idea has in effect been accorded
patent protection.
The bottom line 
With ongoing progress in Internet
delivery and weightless economy
technology, it becomes increasingly
important to understand how
systems of intellectual property rights
affect economic performance. I have
here touched on only the most basic
of economic issues, but ones that
often seem forgotten in the rush to
digest a morass of IPR detail.
The notion of intellectual property
protection has always been slippery,
and will likely become still more so.
However, without appreciating its
proper role in the workings of an
economy, we are left with little but
post-modernist deconstruction of 
fun, altruism, and identity in an
electronic community. Or, at the
other extreme, we get mindless
parroting of simplistic economic
cliches. Neither mushiness seems to
me the right way to go about building
a modern economy.
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